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I E S ECHANNEL STRATEGY ADAPTATION
Abstract
Using transaction cost theory, considerable research in marketing has focused on
conditions under which firms would use direct or vertically integrated versus indirect or
arms-length channels of distribution. Data from the field, however, indicate that channel
configurations are more varied and complex, with multiple channels and composite channels
being just as common as direct and indirect channels.
In an attempt to explain this variety, this paper revisits the influence on channel
structure of another contending variable, namely environmental complexity. We explore the
role and influence of its two components, namely volatility (stability) and heterogeneity
(homogeneity).
Our study of 139 firms in the healthcare industry reveals that firms facing highly
volatile and customer-concentrated environments tend to use direct channels, while firms
facing highly stable and heterogeneous environments tend to use indirect channels.
Intermediate forms such as composite channels and multiple channels were favored by firms
facing combinations of these two types of environments, where the intensity of one
component is high and the other low. In general, firms seem to first choose a business
strategy to address their external environment, and then choose a channel strategy to support
that business strategy. Firms did not always adapt by making structural changes. Under
certain conditions, they simply reallocated channel functions within the same structure, thus
deriving virtually all the benefits of a new structure without having to actually create one.
The authors would like to thank Rajiv Davil and Das Narayandas for their many valuable suggestions and
assistance with the data. The authors would also like to thank David Arnold, Sam Chun, John Gourville, Don
Lehmann, Al Silk, and Kannan Srinivasan for their many useful commnents on an earlier version of this paper.CHANNEL STRATEGY ADAPTATION
1. Introduction
Since the publication of Williamson’s influential transaction cost theory (TCT)
(Williamson 1975, 1985), considerable empirical research in marketing has focused on
conditions under which firms would use direct or vertically integrated versus indirect or
arms-length channels of distribution (see, for example, Anderson and Schmittlein 1984,
Coughlan and Wernerfelt 1989, John and Weltz 1988, and Klein, Frazier, and Roth 1990).
Data from the field, however, indicate that channel configurations are more varied and
complex than the dichotomy proposed by TCT (Anderson, Day, and Rangan, 1997; Rangan,
Corey, and Cespedes 1993). Many firms use a combination of direct channels (e.g.,
salesforce) and indirect channels (e.g., distributors).
Consider, for example, the market for personal computers. IBM and Compaq, the
market leaders, sell direct, through value-added-resellers and also through retailers, often to
overlapping customer segments. Another example is Goodyear’s multiple channels for selling
tires—franchised dealers, tire discount chains (such as National Tire Warehouse), and mass
merchandisers (such as Sears). Manufacturers in several other industries, even while using a
distribution channel, may assume one or two critical channel functions directly—typically the
demand generating or demand influencing functions. Called pull-through selling, this is quite
commonly used by many industrial product firms, such as 3M Company and Becton-
Dickinson—that is, the direct and indirect channels combining their efforts to serve the
customer, rather than any one of them handling it all.
Theorists have argued that many of these intermediate forms are purely transitional
and would eventually be replaced by the pure form, i.e. direct or indirect, in the long run,
under stable conditions. Empirically that appears not to be the case. Many firms under stable
market conditions have adopted a multiplicity of approaches of going-to-market, and these
channel patterns have persisted long enough to be mistaken for an aberration. So there has to
be some complementary explanation that transcends the TCT-based asset-specificity
rationale (1).
(1) According to TCT, when high levels of asset-specific investments (durable investments that cannot be
redeployed without substantial loss of value) are required in downstream channels, vertical integration (or
direct channels) are most transaction cost effective. Conversely, when low levels of asset-specific
investments are sufficient, indirect distribution channels are the more efficient transaction cost alternative.This paper attempts to revisit the influence on channel structure of another
contending variable, namely environmental complexity, which has had a long tradition of
research in the marketing and strategy literature. Influenced by the early work of Strategic
Contingency Theorists (SCT) (Lawrence and Lorsch 1967, Pfeffer and Salancik 1978, and
Thompson 1967), marketing scholars have attempted to study the impact of environmental
complexity on various channel decision-making processes (e.g., Dwyer and Oh 1987, Dwyer
and Welsh 1985, Spekman and Stem 1979). Several of these studies have focused on how the
complexity of the external environment influences centralized, participative, or specialized
channel decision-making processes. The Dwyer and Welsh (1985) study is particularly
relevant to our research because, in addition to channel decision-making processes, it also
addresses questions of channel configuration. The study concludes that in complex
environments (characterized by varying customer demand), firms tend to use fewer
intermediary levels and more direct channels. Curiously, there has been little further
development of Dwyer and Welsh’s (1985) ideas in the marketing literature, but marketing
scholars have continued their investigation of the impact of environmental complexity on
channel structures through the lens of TCT.
While not its central focus, TCT offers directions regarding the effect of
environmental uncertainty (one component of environmental complexity) on channel
structure. According to TCT, when high levels of uncertainty combine with high levels of
asset specificity, the trend toward vertical integration is further strengthened. At low levels of
asset specificity, uncertainty (regardless of whether it is high or low) has no significant
impact on channel structuring (i.e., firms utilizing indirect channels will continue to use
indirect channels). These predictions have found mixed validation in the marketing literature.
Anderson (1985) reported that rather than external uncertainty, difficulty in evaluating
channel performance (she labeled it “Internal uncertainty”) was more influential in
determining a higher level of vertical integration. Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) reported
mixed results offering mild support. Only John and Weltz ( 1988) found that external
uncertainty forces vertical integration.
In summary, while the TCT approach provides guidance on conditions under which
firms would use direct versus indirect channels, its conclusions and verifications in the face
of environmental uncertainty are somewhat equivocal. As pointed out earlier, SCT
applications in marketing channels have declined after a brief flourish in the early 1980s.
Moreover, most of that work focused on channel decision-making processes rather than
channel structure (with the exception of Dwyer and Welsh 1985). Finally, there still does not
appear to be a robust framework for understanding the variety of channels we observe in the
field.
Our research attempts to pick up the investigative stream on the impact of
environmental complexity. To that extent, it is a continuation of the application of SCT in
marketing channels. In keeping with the research in the strategy literature, we conceptualize
environmental complexity along the two dimensions of heterogeneity/homogeneity and
volatility/stability (Aldrich 1979, Dess and Beard 1984, Leblebici and Salancik 1981, Miles
and Snow 1978, Scott 1987). Heterogeneity is defined as the variability in the critical
resources of a business. From a channels perspective, customers are the “downstream
resource” that producers attempt to gain. Hence, marketing scholars have interpreted
environments characterized by widely varying customer sizes, needs, and buying behaviors
as heterogeneous (e.g., Achrol and Stern 1988, Anderson and Weltz 1983).
Volatility is a measure of unpredictability. Thus, fluctuations in customer demand
that are hard to predict constitute volatility. Seasonality and cyclicality are predictable
2changes and hence do not come under the definition. Competitive intensity (conduct) and
behavior (entry and exit), as well as the effects of technological changes, cause uncertainty in
the customer environment, and several marketing scholars have measured them directly as
indicators of volatility (Achrol and Stern 1988, John and Weltz 1988, Klein, Frazier, and
Roth 1990).
Klein, Frazier, and Roth (1990) argued that firms would use direct channels under
conditions of increased “volatility” and more distribution channels under conditions of
increased “heterogeneity”. Their empirical study provided directional support even though
the statistical effects were not significant. There is not much available in the literature,
however, for interpreting channel structures that are neither direct no indirect. These are the
multiple channels, composite channels and other combinations that are widely used by
manufacturers to reach their customers. Multiple channels, as the name implies, give
customers the option of sourcing products and services through more than one distribution
channel. Note that as per our definition, a firm using two separate channels for two different
customer segments would not be considered “multiple”. The multiplicity has to be present at
the customer end. Composite channels, on the other hand, involve two or more channel
members who work in partnership to serve the customer. The customer has only one option,
the composite option. Such a structure is also referred to as a hybrid channel in the literature.
While attempts have been made to interpret these intermediate forms through the lens of
“asset specificity” (see Rangan, Corey, and Cespedes 1993, Walker and Weber 1984), the role
of the external environment in shaping such channels has been less studied.
In this paper, we attempt to explore the role and influence of the two components of
environmental complexity, namely volatility and heterogeneity, on channel structure, defined
broadly to include intermediate forms in addition to the traditionally studied “direct” and
“indirect” alternatives.
As a preliminary hypothesis, based on extant research, we expect more direct
channels in “volatile” environments and more indirect channels in “heterogeneous”
environments.
Strategic Contingency Theorists have for long underscored (see Grandori 1987 for a
review) the evolutionary aspects of organizational structure. According to this line of
thinking, only the better adapted firms in terms of a fit with their chosen environments will
succeed in the long run. This adaptation process has been studied in the strategy literature in
the context of “differentiation” or “integration” of departments and the functions they form.
In the context of this study, channel structure becomes the appropriate focus variable.
Therefore, according to this SCT interpretation, only firms that have suitably adapted their
channel structures to the needs of their output environment will be able to succeed. Most
research has used firm performance as a surrogate for potential sustainability (for example,
Lawrence and Lorsch 1967, Eisenhardt and Zbaracki, 1992). Accordingly, we offer a
variation of our preliminary hypothesis: As a consequence of superior adaptation, we expect
more direct channels in “volatile” environments and more indirect channels in
“heterogeneous” environments only among firms that deliver superior performance. And as
mentioned before, because of the lack of theory regarding hybrid and multiple channels, we
have no predictions. It is one of the goals of this research to offer insights regarding other
origins and evolution. With regard to the intermediate channel forms (i.e., composite and
multiple channels), as the published literature does not provide directions, we approached the
research with an open mind. We wished to develop, rather than test, theory.
3The rest of the paper is divided into five parts. In Part 2 we briefly outline the
empirical context of the study; in Part 3 we present the variables and their measures; in Part 4
we discuss the results of our empirical study; and finally, in Part 5 we provide conclusions
and directions.
2. Data collection
We chose the healthcare industry as the venue for our empirical investigation,
because our library research and knowledge from the popular press indicated that many firms
in this industry perceived their environment to be complex and dynamic. Of course, there
were other industries that qualified on this criterion as well, but using the pragmatic screen of
data access, we settled for the healthcare industry as the appropriate research site.
Following Lehman (1985), who advocates sampling all significant customers in
industrial surveys, we first compiled a comprehensive, national list of firms belonging to six
sectors of the medical equipment and supplies industry with a market share of at least one
percent in their respective sectors. Dunn’s Guide to Healthcare Companies (1989-1990) and
the Medical and Healthcare Marketplace Guide (1990) were used for this purpose. Together
with phone verification, this yielded a total count of 294 firms. After seeking cooperation on
the phone, questionnaires were mailed to individuals responsible for marketing strategy
decisions (i.e., vice presidents, directors, and marketing managers) in each of the 294 firms.
A total of 155 of 294 (52.7%) questionnaires were returned; however, sixteen cases had to be
subsequently dropped because of incomplete questionnaires and other data problems. The
effective sample size, therefore, was n=139, which converts to a final response rate of 47%.
Preliminary steps in questionnaire development and refinement included two rounds
of pre-tests with healthcare marketing managers and several in-depth interviews with
purchasing managers of area hospitals and marketing managers within the healthcare
industry. The final version of the questionnaire, in addition to eliciting the firm’s business
context, asked respondents to assess the environmental complexity facing their firms, the
channel types they used to reach their customers, the levels of business performance they had
attained, and the extent of the channel’s participation in distribution activities.
Following the empirical analyses, we structured follow-up field visits to selected
firms from our sample to better understand the dynamics of their channel adaptation and
evolution. This gave us an opportunity to more richly interpret our empirical conclusions.
Their responses to our questionnaire served as a starting point to structure our field
investigations. The field interviews attempted to understand the rationale for their channels’
evolution, as espoused by key managers. The idea was to get a deeper understanding of some
of the causal relationships identified by the survey results.
3. Measures
Environmental Complexity Measures. As previously noted, our environmental
complexity measures were based on Achrol and Stern (1988), Dess and Beard (1984), Dwyer
and Welsh (1985). Accordingly, a battery of sixteen items measuring volatility and
heterogeneity was developed for this purpose.
4Environmental complexity measures (see Table 1) were evaluated in terms of their
reliability, unidimensionality (i.e., the evidence on congeneric measures; Hunter and Gerbing
1982; Jöreskog and Sörbom 1989), and discriminant validity. Unidimensionality was
assessed in terms of internal and external consistency (cf. Anderson, Gerbing, and Hunter
1987), using procedures specified by Hunter and Gerbing (1982) (1), with the help of ITAN
(Gerbing and Hunter 1988). Internal and external consistency are conceptually analogous to
convergent and discriminant validities, respectively (Hunter 1973). Table 2 shows that
reliabilities were in the acceptable range (Part A, diagonal entries), and exceed .65 in all
cases. Internal consistency is demonstrated by the consistent non-significance of X2 tests on
residuals; similarly, the external consistency claim is supported by the high similarity
coefficients (i.e., Ø indices) that equal or better .92 (Table 2, Part B).
Further evidence of discrimination is provided by the comparison of reliabilities and
inter-trait correlations among item-summed scales (i.e., all correlations are lower than
reliabilities; Table 2, Part A). However, the process of measure purification required the
exclusion of three scale items (one volatility item and two heterogeneity items) originally
included in the instrument. A final diagnostic of measures is provided by a Factor Analysis of
the final thirteen items (Table 1), which shows the emergence of four factors which
cumulatively accounted for 59.6% of the variance in the data. The factors were focused on
demand volatility, competitor volatility, customer heterogeneity, and customer concentration.
As can be seen from Table 1, the eight variables measuring volatility loaded onto two factors,
one representing demand fluctuations and technological changes (demand volatility) and the
other representing competitive behavior (competitor volatility). The five variables measuring
heterogeneity loaded onto two factors, one representing customer heterogeneity in terms of
their buying behaviors and the other representing low or high customer concentration
(customer concentration).
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(1) Internal consistency, or the extent to which correlations among indicators of a trait are attributable solely to
that common trait, was tested by evaluating the residual inter-item correlations with trait effects partialed
out (Hunter and Gerbing 1982, p. 278). X2 tests were performed to check the significance of residual
correlations. Note that, in the latter case, non-significant X2 results signify internal consistency. External
consistency, or the extent to which correlations among indicators of different traits are solely a function of
correlations among the traits themselves, was verified by computing similarity coefficients (ø’s) across the
full set of items (Hunter and Gerbing 1982, p. 281). Table 2 reports mean ø indices (range ± 1.0), where ±
1.0 scores indicate perfect external consistency.Table 1
Description of Environmental Uncertainty Measures
A. Varimax Rotated Factor Matrix
Demand Competitor Customer Customer
Variables      / Factors  Volatility Volatility Heterogeneity Concentration Scale Anchors
Principal Competitors .03045 .82427 .07346 -.00922 1 = 1 - or More; 5 = None
Competitive Entry .16210 .81421 .10109 -.12754 1 = 10 or More; 5 = None
Competitive Exit .10093 .68387 -.08562 .13961 1 = 10 or More; 5 = None
Demand Patterns .46231 .04327 -.11784 .11419 1 = Unpredictable; 3 = Stable
Technological Change (Past) .72319 .03213 .03205 -.00678 1 = Rapid; 7 = No Change
Technological Change (Future) .85153 .01798 .01633 -.02602 1 = Breakthroughs; 7 = No Change
Untapped Market Potential .73392 .08855 .17812 -.05360 1 = Large; 7 = Small
Business Climate .44698 .12381 -.10895 .01771 1 = Volatile; 7 = Stable
End-User Distribution -.16539 .16509 .64223 .31910 1 = Scattered; 7 = Concentrated
End-User Identification .04004 -.04224 .83771 -.01983 1 = Difficult; 7 = Easy
End-User Buying Process .01052 .00604 .77868 .02541 1 = Widely Varying; 7 = Smaller
Large Customer Concentration .07137 -.02738 .08974 .90664 1 = Less than 25%; 4 = 75%-100%
Small Customer Concentration .01497 .03164 .08217 .90538 1 = 75%-100%; 4 = Less than 25%
Eigenvalues 2.519 2.124 1.646 1.464 Cum.Var. Explained 59.6%
6Table 2
Assessment of Environmental Uncertainty Measures
A. Reliability and Inter-Trait Correlations
Demand Competitor Customer Customer
Volatility Volatility Heterogeneity Concentration
Constructs (No. of Items)  T1 (5) T2 (3) T3 (3) T4 (2)
Tl .67
T2 .2370 (p<.05) .69
T3 .0677 .0620 .66
T4 .0681 .0300 .1953 (p<.05) .83
B. Unidimensionality (1)
Internal Consistency
Residual Means .0594 .0393 .0453 .0455
X
2 (p-value) 5.81 (p>. 10) 1.49 (p>. 10) 2.08 (p>. 10) Not Applicable
External Consistency
Mean Ø Score .9544 .9500 .9200 .9900
(1) Ø values and residual mean scores were computed using formulae proposed by Hunter and Gerbing (1982: 278-28 1) . The inferential X2 test was mounted
using X2 = ∑ P2. √n-2 where  ∑ P2 is the sum of squared partials (i.e., residuals), n is the sample size, and df is defined as number of partials compared minus
one. This X2 test for two-item scales is not possible because df = 0.
7Channel Type Measures. We asked respondents to indicate the channel
type/combinations used by them to sell a majority of their sales volumes for the particular
product sector under investigation.
Thus, the channel data reported in this study are at the level of a product segment.
The responses were coded into four channel types in decreasing order of manufacturer
participation in channel activities.
Traditionally, the first two channel types would be considered direct and the last two
indirect, but because of our broader interest, we have categorized them into four types:
Direct: When manufacturers sold exclusively through their own salesforce and/or
through company-owned distributors.
Composite: When manufacturers sold through a combination of company-owned salesforce
and independent distributors, with the two working together to effect common
sales. The channel activities in this instance were shared; the activities
associated with generating the sale were usually effected by the company-
owned salesforce with support from the distributor, and the activities associated
with fulfilling the sale were effected by the distributor with help from the
manufacturer.
Multiple: When the company-owned salesforce and/or independent distributors and/or
agents each sold to the targeted customer segment. It is the overlap of two or
sometimes three channels with access to the same customer segment that
defined this alternative.
Indirect: When all sales to end-users were exclusively handled by outside distributors or
agents. The company did not extend its effort beyond the distributor.
Performance Measures. The performance of the firm was evaluated using two self-
reported measures. Respondents were asked to provide their approximate market share rank
in their product group (response range was: first, second, third, fourth, and fifth or lower),
and their overall profitability (response categories were: below industry average, about
industry average, and above industry average) in the last three years. Firms with a market
share rank of first, second or third with higher than industry average profitability were
classified as Better Performing firms (51 firms), and the remainder were designated Worse
Performing firms (88 firms) (1). While this performance classification may appear somewhat
subjective, it has precedents in both the PIMS literature (Buzzell and Gale 1987) and the
more recent work within marketing (Deshpande, Farley, and Webster 1993; Noordewier,
John, and Nevin 1990). We would have liked more precise information on sales, profits, and
market share, but when pre-testing, we learned that many respondents considered such
information too sensitive to reveal. However, in order to confirm its validity, we also
gathered data on indirect measures of performance. These consisted of measures of the firms’
strengths vis-à-vis competition along several dimensions, such as strength of distribution
network, sales network, product quality, product line breadth, channel leadership and price
leadership. While these measures were also self-reported, they provide a valuable cross-
validation of our performance measures. We expected the better-performing firms to manifest
their strength through higher scores on these attributes. A MANOVA revealed significant
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(1) As an exception, three firms with high market share who reported only “average profitability” were
included in the Better Performing category.differences between the better-performing and the worse-performing groups (Pillal’s Trace
.14, p<.001), confirming our grouping criteria.
4. Data analyses and interpretation
Recall that, supporting our a priori expectations, the factor analysis of the
environmental uncertainty measures had yielded four factors, labeled as demand volatility,
competitor volatility, customer heterogeneity, and customer concentration (Table 1). We next
composed factor scores for each firm along these four dimensions (i.e., the four factors),
using coordinate information from the factor solution. Using these factor scores as the
independent variables and the four channel options as the dependent variable, we estimated
two logit models; one for the entire data base of 139 firms, and one only for the 51 high
performance firms. Both models offered only a modest degree of fit. As mentioned before,
there was no a priori theory to support the multinomial channel choice model, and the lack of
a fit merely underscored the need to better understand the data from a theory-building rather
than a theory-testing perspective. With that in mind, we used a data-analysis approach that
helped us understand the variation in our sample in a contingent framework.
We performed a hierarchical cluster analysis (Table 3) based on the four factor
scores to identify clearly differentiated environmental groups (1). The cluster analysis
isolated three distinct groups in the sample. As the means of Table 3 attest, these groups
differ in how they perceive the environments facing their firms. The inferential statistics also
suggest differences amongst the three groups (Table 3, lower half). MANOVA points to the
overall differences, while ANOVAs show significant group differences along all four factors.
Finally, Duncan’s tests find most group comparisons to be significant in specific paired
comparisons. In sum, cluster analysis yielded clearly demarcated, internally valid industry
groups with significant differences along the theoretically meaningful variables of perceived
heterogeneity and volatility.
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(1) The hierarchical clustering approach initially designates each respondent as a unique cluster, and then
successively merges respondents/clusters until all respondents that display similarity of response patterns
are included within single clusters. Squared Euclidean distance and Ward’s linkage method, respectively,
were used as the proximity measure and the clustering algorithm; their choice appearing appropriate for the
current task (cf. Hair, Anderson, and Tatham 1987; Punj and Stewart 1983). Since cluster solutions are not
inferentially based, successful internal and external validation using probabilistic statistics acquires critical
significance (cf. Speece, McKinney, and Appelbaum 1985). Consequently, both forms of validity were
checked for and found to hold (Table 2).Table 3
Cluster Analysis Results: Description and Internal Validation
Description of Clusters (1)
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Cluster Size N = 58 N = 5 N = 36
Cluster Label  Volatile- Stable- Volatile
Large Customers Large Customers Small Customers
Constructs 
Description Means Std. Dev. Means Std. Dev.  Means Std. Dev.
Demand Volatility 2.997 .655 4.515 .553 3.515 .805
Competitor Volatility 3.339 .701 3.958 .371 3.784 .430
Customer Heterogeneity 4.880 .775 5.283 .722 4.821 1.039
Customer Concentration 3.107 .448 3.125 .449 1.898 .585
Internal Validation
Power of Duncan’s
Univariate Summary (ANOVA) F-Ratio (p-value) Test (1-ß) Paired Comparisons
Significant at .05
Demand Volatility 59.04 (.00) .99 All Pairs
Competitor Volatility 18.18 (.00) .99 Clusters l&2, l&3
Customer Heterogeneity 3.76 (.03) .68 Clusters 1&2, 2&3
Customer Concentration 103.69 (.00) .99 Clusters 2&3, l&3
Multivariate Summary (MANOVA) 47.82 (.00) .99
(1) Smaller mean values show greater levels of volatility and heterogeneity.
The contrasts between the clusters is evident from Table 3 and Figures 1(a) and 1(b).
Cluster 1 is composed of firms that perceived a high degree of volatility (as opposed to
stability) and a moderate degree of heterogeneity in their environment. Firms in this cluster
reported a high level of demand and competitive volatility. The mean scores of the variables
composing the homogeneity/heterogeneity construct indicated that firms in this cluster had a
high concentration of large customers. The buying behavior variations were less significant.
We therefore label this segment Volatile-Large Customers. In contrast, Cluster 2 is
composed of firms that perceived a high degree of stability in their environment, especially
with respect to demand fluctuations. There were minimal buying behavior variations, and the
customer base was even more skewed in the direction of large customers. We label this
segment Stable-Large Customers. In contrast to Clusters 1 and 2, Cluster 3 is characterized
by a modest degree of customer heterogeneity, but certainly a higher concentration of small
end-users. This segment displayed moderate demand volatility as well. We therefore label
this segment Volatile-Small Customers.
10Figure 1a
Cluster Locations
The channels of distribution used by the firms in each of these three segments is
indicated in Table 4. Firms in Clusters 1 and 2 as compared to firms in Cluster 3 used a
significantly higher proportion of direct channels, and conversely, firms in Cluster 3 used a
significantly higher proportion of indirect channels. We believe this difference is driven by
the dispersion and size of customers in Cluster 3. They are on the average smaller, and
moderately more heterogeneous compared to their counterparts in the other clusters.
Interestingly, at a first blush, Clusters 1 and 2 displayed more or less similar distribution
patterns, even though one was characterized by a volatile environment and the other by a
stable environment. We believe that the composition of these clusters—large, identifiable
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Figure 1b
Cluster LocationsTable 4
Channels of Distribution: Adaptation by Environment
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Cluster 3
Volatile - Large Stable - Large Volatile - Small
Customers Customers Customers
h = 58 n = 45 n = 36
%% %
Directa 34.5 31.1 19.4
Compositeb 29.3 42.2 27.8
Multiplec 19.0 17.8 22.2
Indirectd 17.2 8.9 30.6
At p = .05, z test for difference is significant for the following pairs:
a Clusters 1,3 and 2,3. 
b Clusters 1,2 and 2,3.
c None.
d Clusters 1,3 and 2,3.
Specifically, then, the homogeneity/heterogeneity dimension appears to influence a
firm’s choice of direct versus indirect channels, confirming previous speculations (Dwyer and
Welsh 1988, and Klein, Frazier, and Roth 1990). Direct channels appear to be the preferred
alternative in homogeneous markets composed of large customers, and indirect channels in
(moderately) heterogeneous markets composed of many small customers. To put it even more
simply, direct channels are preferred when selling to large customers and indirect channels
when selling to a more dispersed set of smaller customers. This result is intuitive, simple, and
makes perfect managerial sense. But it is important to underscore that it is the combination of
large customers with fairly similar buying patterns that seems to drive direct channels; just as
it is the combination of small customers with varying buying behaviors that seems to drive
indirect channels.
TCT scholars could argue that this result is perfectly explained by TCT’s asset
specificity construct (see Anderson 1985). The argument is that deep customer knowledge
and a close relationship is a prerequisite when dealing with large customers, and that such
knowledge is unique and nothing but a manifestation of human asset specificity (i.e., the
specialized account manager). However, this raises the question of whether “asset
specificity” is the causal or caused construct. Our findings indicate that environmental
complexity is the more appropriate antecedent. The construction of an account-specific
salesforce is simply an adaptive response to the environment. In other words, the nature of
the environmental complexity affects the choice of downstream asset specificity, which in
turn defines channel structure.
Our results do not dispute the influence of the other dimension of environmental
complexity (namely, volatility) on channel integration (i.e., the higher the volatility, the
higher the level of vertical integration); they merely indicate that market homogeneity and
customer size appear to be strong causes as well.
When the clusters are further divided into better-performing and worse-performing
firms, some interesting nuances become discernible; and the role of volatility emerges more
clearly, as can be seen in Table 5.
12A significantly higher percentage of the better-performing firms in Clusters 1 and 2
(i.e., the large end-user environment) use either a direct or a composite channel to reach their
customers (84%) than the worse-performing group. Our speculation is that when serving
large customers, because of the order sizes involved, suppliers prefer to take control of their
distribution channel. There is too much business at stake. They could do this by selling
directly or by a composite arrangement where they manage the up-front selling functions
themselves, while the back-end fulfillment functions are managed by the distributor. In either
case, the supplier is directly involved in generating the sale.
Table 5
Channels of Distribution: Adaptation by Environment and Performance Group
Cluster #1 Cluster #2 Cluster #3
Volatile - Stable - Volatile -
Large Customers Large Customers Small Customers
Better Performing Group n=23 n=19 n=9
%%%
Direct 52.2a 21.1 22.2
Composite 30.4 63.2c 22.2
Multiple 13.0b 10.5 33.3
Indirect 4.3 5.3 22.2
Worse Performing Group n=35 n=26 n=27
%%%
Direct 22 .9a 38.5 18.5
Composite 28.6 27.0c 29.6
Multiple 22.9 23.1 18.5
Indirect 25.7b 11.5 33.3
a,b At p = .05, the z test for difference is significant for direct as well as indirect channels across the better and
worse performing groups.
c At p = .05, the z test for difference is significant for the composite channel across the better and worse
performing groups.
Because of the small n for the high performance group, tests for differences were not computed.
When comparing channel preferences among Clusters 1 and 2, it is clear that the
preference for the direct channel is stronger among the better-performing firms in the volatile
environment than among those in the stable environment. This is very much in keeping with
the predictions of TCT regarding the impact of uncertainty on vertical integration. To start
with, large customers are crucially important for the business because of the volumes they
bring. In addition, when the environment is volatile because of both competitor activity and
demand uncertainty, it may make sense for the manufacturer to be in a position to control its
own destiny by vertically integrating (or going direct). This way it would not be subject to
the vagaries of the middlemen and their opportunism or lack of commitment to the
manufacturer’s brand.
It is interesting to note, however, that the better-performing firms in Cluster 2
preferred composite to direct channels, even though they served large customers as well.
13Firms in Cluster 2 face a tug-of-war between the environmental effects of stability
versus large customer concentration and homogeneity. On the one hand, the stable
environment drives them towards distribution channels, because under such circumstances it
would be possible to specify and manage every eventuality in a third-party contract instead of
resorting to the costlier internal option. On the other hand, because of the large customer
concentration and little variation in their buying behaviors, a direct channel is preferred. The
end result is a hybrid, with some functions being performed directly and others being
delivered through the intermediary. The composite channel, then, is a useful way to tap into
the economies of transportation, scope, and other conveniences that distributors bring to the
customer, without giving up the effectiveness of accessing and negotiating with the large
customers directly. In spite of the large order sizes, distributors may be the more cost-
efficient route for order fulfillment when scope economies are involved, especially the larger
distributors. That is because distributors are able to put together an assortment for the
customer that is much broader than any one supplier’s product range, thus economizing on
the multiple order processing and shipment costs that customers would have to bear if they
ordered directly from their respective suppliers. Such an approach seems to be more
successful in a stable rather than a volatile environment, vertical integration being the
preferred option in the latter. As discussed before, in a volatile environment, it would be
impossible to write a contract that predicts every eventuality. Thus, a firm may wish to
control many of the distribution channel functions in order to gain the necessary agility in the
marketplace. At the extreme it leads to vertical integration.
Because of the small number of better-performing firms in Cluster 3, we hesitate to
make definitive inferences. But following the logic developed for the other clusters, we
hypothesize that environmental volatility drives towards direct channels, whereas customer
size (small) and buying behavior variation drives towards indirect channels. The end result is
that no single channel or combination seems to dominate. Interestingly, in a Cluster 2
environment, when there was a tug-of-war between the opposing channel implications of the
two dimensions of environmental complexity, we saw the predominance of the composite
channel. Why not in this case (Cluster 3) as well? Why multiple channels?
We believe the reason centers around manufacturers’ advantage in scale economies
as opposed to distributors’ advantage in scope economies. Small, dispersed customers are
inherently unattractive for manufacturers. The costs of constructing a direct selling system
outweigh the benefits of direct customer orders. Customers are small and place only small
orders; distributors may be better poised to sell and service them. But if these small
customers are not varied in their buying behaviors, direct selling approaches like
telemarketing could well work. Also, if the product is such that customers’ need for a
complementary assortment is minimal, then there is the possibility of distributors (or
manufacturers’ reps) writing the order for direct drop-shipment by the supplier. In effect, a
different kind of composite channel could emerge in Cluster 3 environments not constrained
by the business parameters of the industry under research (i.e., the healtheare industry).
Building on the logic of the observed channels for the three clusters, one could
attempt to predict the channel form for a stable environment, characterized by small,
dispersed customers. It would largely be served by indirect or distribution channels. A stable
environment would enable the producer to write a contingent claims contract with a third
party without fear of subversion, and customer dispersion and size would further encourage
the choice of local distributors in order to accomplish the required coverage. Thus, both
forces would work hand-in-hand to reinforce the choice of a third party distribution channel.
14Our summary conclusions are best captured by Table 6. The different combinations
of the dimensions of environmental complexity indicate different dominant channel forms.
Our results indicate that by carefully identifying the source of complexity as customer
heterogeneity and/or size or market volatility, one can attempt to explain the variety of
channels we observe in the real world. A word of caution: such a generalization is only
meaningful in those settings that have the characteristics of the healthcare industry studied in
this research. For example, the role of the distributor and associated scope economies become
meaningful only if customers seek product complements and assortments. That may not be
the case in all industries. But even working within this limitation, it is possible to see the
implications of our findings.
From Table 6, it is clear that there is so much that we do not know. One can hazard a
guess as to the appropriate channel form for the empty cells, but given that our one-industry
application did not unearth the environments indicated by the empty cells, it would be an
exercise in speculation. For example, in cell 1, environmental stability and the small
customer segment would indicate an indirect channel, but because of similarity in buying
characteristics (low heterogeneity) among the customers, it may be possible to sell direct or
via a hybrid form as well, depending on the nature of the product and the complementary
assortment within which it is bought. This is precisely our point. The underlying reasons
guiding a firm’s channel choice are far more complex than suggested by extant theory. In
fact, Table 5 and Figure 2 tell us a very important story. Even though 84% of the better-
performing firms in Cluster 1 used direct or hybrid channels, a good 17% used other forms.
Similarly, 16% of the firms in Cluster 2 attained high performance without using a direct or a
hybrid channel.
Table 6, therefore, is best interpreted as providing guidance on the dominant channel
form. A significant minority of other channel forms also appear to deliver equally good




Small Customer Large Customer
Lo. Hetero Hi. Hetero Lo. Hetero Hi. Hetero
Stable (Cell 1) Indirect Hybrid ?
Volatile ? Multiple ? Direct
5. Conclusions
There are many limitations to the research discussed in this paper, not the least of
which is our longitudinal inference on channel adaptation from cross-sectional data. While
we stand by our inferences, a more compelling case could have been made had the data
15tracked channel transitions as firms’ strategic choices and external environments changed.
Several field research visits gave us confidence in our conclusions, but we would be remiss in
not acknowledging this methodological liberty taken by our research. Moreover, one should
always view with caution the generalizability of any study based on data from one industry at
one period in time. However, as our major purpose here is to build rather than test theory, we
believe that our methodological liberties are not fatal.
In this concluding section, we would like to draw our readers’ attention to the
broader and more important implications of our research. Although we have not offered
undisputed proof of its veracity, if our directional conclusions hold up to further replications
and extensions, then we believe we have offered significant new directions for channel
research as a whole. We have uncovered environmental conditions under which composite
channels and multiple channels could be optimal. These channels, while widely prevalent in
the field, have not received much scholarly attention.
Company X, a participant in this study, sold its medical supplies through a network
of 65 company sales representatives and about a dozen large national distributors.
Traditionally, its salesforce called on the end-users and educated them on product detail and
built brand loyalty; however, all customer orders were effected by the distributors, including
price/quantity negotiations.
Because of the commodity (low-technology) nature of the product —blood
collection needles and tubes— not many competitors had entered this market. According to
this company’s Sales VP:
Frequently purchased supply items like ours came in for much closer price
scrutiny. Hospitals facing severe cost pressures at their end stalled to put spec. items
like ours on bid too. They were aligning themselves into buying groups to get
purchasing power ... This was a big transition for us because even though our
products are low value supplies, we have worked very hard to differentiate them in
the eyes of the end-users.
We had no choice but to work directly with our hospital customers to ensure
that we made it to the shortlist; in fact, most of our 65 salespeople took on the price
and contract negotiating role. They had never done that in the past. Their job then
was to influence the end-user to specify our products. In the old system, our
distributors booked the orders. Even in the new system, our large
national distributors are very much in the picture. They perform the actual physical
distribution and order fulfillment tasks. In short, we haven’t altered our distributors.
We are very supportive of them, but our salesforce is considerably more active in
negotiating the sale. We book orders directly. This way, we are better able to control
our market share and market volume.
This case illustrates the subtle evolution of a channel system in direct response to
changes in the buying environment. On the one hand, Company X faced a stable environment
(mature product and no new entrants), suggesting the appropriateness of a distribution
channel; but on the other hand, the cost-containment environment caused customer
consolidation, which eventually influenced how customers purchased such products. Thus,
the large customer’s buying response, especially with respect to price sensitivity, dictated a
direct channel. The firm’s adaptive response involved a further shift towards more direct
execution of certain channel functions by its salesforce, without altering its existing
distribution structure. Such a concept of channels as a collection of tasks, was first proposed
16by Bucklin (1966), but not widely studied, perhaps because most channels in the 60s, 70s, and
early 80s were pure. Composite or hybrid channels are somewhat more common in the 90s.
While some firms in our sample, under similar circumstances, chose to adapt by
vertically integrating, Company X adapted by virtual integration. It carefully took on
responsibility for certain key channel functions which would enable it to maintain its
competitive posture with its customers. In other words, channel adaptations need not always
be structural. By assuming responsibility for critical channel tasks even while external agents
fulfill other tasks, one can mimic the effect of an integrated channel structure. This is an
especially important adaptive mechanism in the channels context because of the difficulty in
retiring historically strong distribution relationships. The composite channels approach gives
producers the chance to be responsive without necessarily severing old ties.
Multiple channels emerge under quite different circumstances. First of all, they seem
to emerge under conditions of volatility. Many of the firms in this environment operate in a
rapidly growing market, the growth rate being unpredictable. Simultaneously, or because of
it, customer buying behaviors also appear varied. And perhaps because of the rapidly
growing environment, customers also appear to be varied in their size. Given this high degree
of uncertainty and variation, and lack of a clear winning channel form, firms appear to be
betting on a variety of outcomes, both in terms of customers and in terms of channels.
According to Anderson, Day and Rangan (1997), “In coping with turbulence, channel
diversity pays ... a bundle of options also allows a firm to move faster, as it recognizes and
seizes opportunities.”
While one can appreciate the validity of this finding just by looking around at
channels for high-technology products, an important unanswered research question is “What
happens when growth settles out?” Our study indicates that channel forms such as indirect or
hybrid could emerge as winners. But then the firm has to consciously adapt its multiple
channel as the environment evolves.
This means the proactive retirement of one or the other channel or a reallocation of
channel functions.
We offer the following account of the process by which firms design their channels
of distribution. First, they formulate a business strategy in response to their external
environment. Channel structure then is a support mechanism to implement the chosen
business strategy. Thus, effective channel structures are a reflection of the environmental
complexity faced by the business and the strategy chosen by the firm.
Company Y, at the time of this study, sold its range of ultrasound equipment and
respiratory therapy products through its direct salesforce of nearly 150 representatives. It
registered some token sales through a handful of distributors, but the proportion of sales
through this channel was minimal. However, until two years before, the company had sold its
products through the combined efforts of nearly 100 salespeople and almost 100 distributors,
with distributors accounting for nearly 25-30% of total sales. But at that time, in addition to
its ultrasound and respiratory therapy products, the company had also sold medical supplies
and gases as well. According to its CEO:
We made a strategic decision to exit from the commodity end of our business.
We were not making money on the supplies and the gases, and it made sense
to exit those businesses ... But if all you have is value-added equipment, a salesforce
17is a much better way to sell those products in our industry. First of all, these products
are high-technology, requiring careful and sophisticated presentation to the end-user,
especially the large teaching hospitals. Over the years, our salesforce was actually
performing most of this customer education anyway ... And in any case, as part of
our overall product strategy, we were planning to launch a series of high-technology
products like CPU Ventilators and Patient-Care Monitors, all of which would have
required a concerted educational effort, because we were creating, not merely
fulfilling demand.
Our channel strategy was a sensible projection of our own product-market
strategy ... The uncertainty of a high-technology, high value-added business
combined with our focus on large, urban hospitals is better handled by our salesforce
than by our distributors.
The adaptive response of Company Y sheds light on the intertwining of business
strategy and channel structure. To a large extent, by choosing to focus on high-technology
new products rather than commodities, this company entered into a more volatile
environment than the one it had operated in previously. Both the nature of the technology and
its potential user, the large teaching hospitals, increased the unknowns for this company.
Because its distributors were unable to help in the course of its new strategy, the company
chose to expand its salesforce and dramatically shrink distribution. In addition to
exemplifying the tendency of firms to vertically integrate in the face of volatile -
homogeneous - large customer environments, this case illustrates that a channel structure is
not a mere adaptation to external environmental forces, but in fact an adaptation to the
company’s strategic choice of which environment it wants to play in. A firm’s channel
structure, then, is a calculated response in support of its long-term business strategy.
We suggest that this environmental adaptation is perhaps the deeper link that is
played out through the widely accepted “asset specificity” variable of transaction-cost theory.
Future research would be better served by focusing on these antecedents rather than
continuing with the attempts to fine-tune the operational indicators of transaction-specific
assets. Moreover, an approach like the one we have attempted to show in this paper has the
potential to offer a rational explanation for the variety of channels that producers use to
access their respective markets. The direct versus indirect dichotomy, while conceptually
convenient and elegant, is too narrow in practice.
We conclude that vertical integration in its purest form is an attempt to manage and
control environmental uncertainty. In practice, however, owing to the difficulty of changing
channel relationships or perhaps because of evolutionary cost advantages (such as a
distributor’s economies of scope and transportation), a perfectly acceptable form of virtual
integration might involve a composite of direct and indirect channels performing a web of
interdependent tasks. This clever adaptation under certain environmental conditions could be
long-run optimal.
Channels are far more complex, amorphous, and dynamic (in spite of their
reputation for being sticky) than our interpretation of extant theories would allow. Theories
such as transaction cost theory and strategic contingency theory have provided us with initial
trajectories. The time has now come to build a theory-in-use of channel configuration and
adaptation. We strongly believe that only such a grounded exploration could enhance our
understanding of contemporary channel structures.
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